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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Scope1

This memorandum first discusses the scope of the doctrine of State official immunity.
The memorandum addresses all possible individuals, organizations and entities that can
successfully claim immunity from an international tribunal’s jurisdiction as applied to the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
Second, this memorandum evaluates whether the doctrine of State official immunity
prevents international tribunals and international or hybrid courts from subpoenaing witnesses.
The memorandum will evaluate a national court’s ability to subpoena State officials for witness
testimony, applying International Court of Justice precedent. This memorandum will then
analyze how previous ad hoc and hybrid tribunals have approached subpoenaing State officials
for witness testimony looking at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the
International Criminal Court and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The
memorandum will evaluate whether the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has the authority to
subpoena witness testimony from State officials based on the international, hybrid and national
tribunal precedent.

1

Topic Question Presented: What is the current state of the law of the international tribunals
(e.g., ICC, ICTY/R and SCSL) relating to the functional and personal immunity of state officials
who are called as witnesses before international and internationalized/hybrid courts? Please
research who qualifies as a state official. In particular, what is the status of quasi-state actors
and/or entities with regard to immunity?
6
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B.

Summary of Conclusions
1.

Scope of State Immunity
a.

State officials either have ratione personae or ratione materiae
immunity or both depending on their rank and position. State
official immunity protects State officials from a National court’s
jurisdiction for both crimes and civil suits and includes protection
from subpoenas for witness testimony. State officials do not enjoy
immunity for international crimes prosecuted in International
Courts or Tribunals.

b.

Heads of State are afforded both ratione personae and ratione
materiae immunity while in office or for criminal acts committed
while in office. Officials claiming head of State immunity must
have either de jure or de facto head of state positions.

c.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy ratione personae immunity
from both civil and criminal jurisdiction.

d.

Ministers and other High-Ranking officials enjoy ratione materiae
immunities for acts completed in their official capacities while in
office. International crimes may not be considered actions in a
State official’s official capacity.

e.

Diplomats have immunity for both criminal and civil jurisdiction
in descending degrees depending on whether the official is part of
1) the diplomatic staff, 2) the administrative and technical staff, or
3) the service staff.

f.

Constituent States (territorial and constitutional entities forming
part of a sovereign state, like Burma or federated States) may have
ratione materiae but not ratione personae but many jurisdictions
do not grant immunity because they lack individual personalities
that have foreign relations with other nations.

g.

State agencies are immune from criminal and civil jurisdiction if
the entity 1) does not have a separate legal personality and 2) is
entitled to perform and performs public acts under the State
authority.

h.

Employees who contract with State may have immunity if 1) the
employee has official status and 2) performs functions in the
exercise of governmental authority. Courts are careful to draw the
line to not include administrative tasks not in the core area of
sovereignty.

7
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2.

i.

Consuls on special mission have immunity for special missions
only under ratione materiae and not for their private acts.

j.

Armed forces visiting in a foreign State have only the level of
immunity as accorded in an Agreement with the visiting State.

Immunity from witness subpoenas at international tribunals
a.

International and internationalized tribunal have the authority to
subpoena witness testimony from State officials. Factors that
determine whether the tribunal as the authority to subpoena State
officials are the court
i.

is predominantly an international court

ii.

has a statute that explicitly grants the authority to prosecute
State officials regardless of their rank

iii.

has rules of evidence and procedure that allow the court to
subpoena witnesses

b.

Nuremberg. Fulfills all three elements: it is a purely international
tribunal, the charter strips State official immunity from prosecuting
criminals, and the charter grants the Judges authority to subpoena
witnesses.

c.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
Has the authority to issue subpoenas to State officials. The ICTY
was formed by a Security Council and has other features that make
it an international tribunal. The Tribunal’s statute strips State
official immunity from prosecution of crimes under its jurisdiction.
The ICTY also grants the Judges authority to issue subpoenas. The
ICTY’s Krstic decision allowed the tribunal to directly subpoena
State officials and is commonly cited as authority for such powers.

d.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The ICTR has
the authority to issue subpoenas to State officials. The ICTR was
formed by the Security Council and has other features that make it
an international tribunal. It strips State official immunity from
prosecution of crimes under its jurisdiction. The ICTR grants
Judges the authority to issue subpoenas. The ICTR’s Bagasora
case allowed witness subpoenas to State officials.

e.

Special Court for Sierra Leone. The SCSL has the authority to
subpoena State official witnesses. It is predominantly an

8
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international tribunal based on its judicial composition and subject
matter jurisdiction. The SCSL Statute contains a provision
eliminating State official immunity for prosecution. The SCSL
rules of evidence and procedure grant Judges the authority to
subpoena witnesses. The SCSL case law has granted subpoenas
for State officials.
f.

International Criminal Court. The ICC may have difficulty
issuing subpoenas to State officials not a party to the ICC statute.
The Court is an international court treated by a universal
multilateral treaty. Its Statute eliminates State official immunity
for prosecution. Its Rules of Evidence and Procedure do not
provide the Judges with authority to issue subpoenas. Only
voluntary witness requests.

g.

The Extraordinary Chambers for the Criminal Court of
Cambodia. The ECCC may have the authority to issue subpoenas.
It is a hybrid court but has subject matter jurisdiction over
international crimes. It is not clearly an international court. It
strips State official immunity from prosecution. Its Rules of
Evidence and Procedure grant the Judges authority to subpoena
witnesses. It has not been successful in obtaining State official
witness testimony after subpoena and the issue is unresolved.

h.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The STL will have the
authority to subpoena State officials if it is an international
tribunal. The STL is predominantly an international tribunal but
may have difficulty issuing subpoenas to State officials because its
subject matter jurisdiction is not an international crime. It does not
include a provision stripping State official immunity for
prosecution, however such practice may be customary international
law. The STL has the authority to subpoena witnesses generally.

9
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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri and 22 other persons were killed in a car

explosion in downtown Beirut on February 14, 2005. 2 Several investigations have not yet
reliably determined the cause of the killings, however it is clear that political polarization
regarding the strong Syrian influence in Lebanon significantly played a role in the events leading
up to the killings.3 Commissioner Mehlis’ report concluded that “[t]here is probable cause to
believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri could not have been
taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been
further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services.”4
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon thus likely will require access to Syrian high-ranking officials’
witness testimony to determine the cause of the assassination and the true culpability.

A.

Brief Historical Background on Lebanese/Syrian conflict

Lebanon was involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict during its civil war of 1975-1990
which had a destructive impact on Lebanese national unity and independence.5 Lebanon

2

U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes,
circumstances and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Peter FitzGerald, S.C.
Pres. Statement 2005/4, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/4 (Feb. 15, 2005) (“It is also the Mission’s conclusion that the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic bears primary responsibility for the political tension that preceded the
assassination of the former Prime Minister, Mr. Hariri. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic clearly exerted
influence that went beyond the reasonable exercise of cooperative or neighborly relations.”) Id. at 3. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
3

Id.

4

U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1595 (2005), Detlev Mehlis, Commissioner Beirut, S.C. Doc.
S/2005/662 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
5

Id.
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consented to Syrian Arab Republic military occupation in May 1976 when the then-Syrian leader
Hafez Al-Assad sent troops to strengthen the Lebanese Christian Maronite government.6 Syria’s
escalating political influence in Lebanese affairs was sanctioned in 1991 by a treaty of
“Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination.”7 In October of 1989 Lebanese political figures
voiced their opposition to the Syrian influence after Israel withdrew its forces from South
Lebanon in 2000 calling for the implementation of the full Taif Agreement of 1989.8 During the
debates that ensued, former Prime Minister Hariri’s relations with Syrian President Emil Lahoud
were strained.9 The Security Council adopted a resolution (1559) in response to Lebanese efforts
to achieve independence from Syrian influence which required all foreign forces to withdraw
from Lebanon and supported a fair electoral process for their upcoming election.”10 The Fact
Finding Mission after Hariri’s assassination gathered from numerous sources that the Syrian
leadership held Hariri “personally responsible for the adoption of the resolution, and that this

6

Katherine Iliopoulos, Hariri Tribunal Opens in The Hague, Crimes of War Project (2009), available at,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-lebonon.html. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
7

U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes,
circumstances and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Peter FitzGerald, S.C.
Pres. Statement 2005/4, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/4 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 1].
If the full Taif Agreement was implemented it “would have substantially reduced the Syrian presence in Lebanon
to a possible complete pull-out.” Id.
8

“As a prominent security official close to the Syrian Arab Republic put it to the Mission, the two men had had
repeated conflicts during Mr. Hariri’s term (2000-2004) to a point that required ‘external intervention and mediation
on a daily basis.’ The conflict between Mr. Lahoud and Mr. Hariri affected the latter’s ability to run the Government
and to carry out his policies, sometimes to the point of paralysis.” Id.
9

S. C. Res. 1559, Preamble and ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1559 (Sept. 4, 2004) (calling upon “all remaining foreign
forces to withdraw from Lebanon” and declaring “its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon’s
upcoming presidential elections conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign
interference or influence”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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resolution marked the end of whatever trust existed between the two sides.”11 After the Syrian
President’s term was extended by another three years, Hariri resigned resulting in increased
political tension between the two countries.12 The UN Secretary General appointed a special
envoy to implement the Resolution with which the Lebanese and Syrian officials began meeting
in early February of 2005 to discuss how to accomplish the requests of the Resolution.13 Hariri
and 22 others were assassinated a few days later.

B.

Formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Security Council signed an agreement with Lebanon to form the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon to “try the suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri.”14 The Government of Lebanon requested that the Security Council establish an
international tribunal to which the Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1664 to
negotiate an agreement with Lebanon for the establishment of the Tribunal.15 The Tribunal has
jurisdiction over attacks that occurred between October 1, 2004 and December 12, 2005 and
attacks that are “connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and…of a nature

11

U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon inquiring into the causes,
circumstances and consequences of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Peter FitzGerald, S.C.
Pres. Statement 2005/4, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/4 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 1].
12

Id. at ¶ 3.
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Katherine Iliopoulos, Hariri Tribunal Opens in The Hague, Crimes of War Project (2009), available at,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-lebonon.html [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].
14

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
15

Id. Resolution Annex, Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of
a Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
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and gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2004.”16 The Tribunal may also have
jurisdiction over similar crimes that occur after the specified date if the parties to the Statute, the
Lebanese Government and the Security Council so agree. When the Lebanese parliament failed
to ratify the agreement through its domestic legislative process by June 10, 2007 as required by
the Statute, the Security Council authorized the formation of the tribunal under Chapter VII of
the Security Council powers. 17

III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

State Immunity Generally

The doctrine of State immunity is a bar from the exercise of jurisdiction over States and
some of their officials to preserve the orderly conduct of international relations so that the States
may carry out their public functions effectively.18 The law of head of state immunity comes
from notions of “sovereign equality and is aimed at ensuring that states do not unduly interfere
with other states and their agents.”19 This principle “that a State may not exercise its authority
on the territory of another State” based on the “principle of sovereign equality among all
Members of the United Nations”20 codified in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United
Nations grants foreign State officials immunity so they may perform their official duties without

16

Id.
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United Nations Security Council 5686 Meeting Record on the Creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
S/PV.5685 30 (May 2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
18

HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 1 (2nd ed. 2008) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
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Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 A.J.I.L. 407, 407 (July
2004) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
20

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 2 (Feb. 14)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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being subject to arrest or detention.21 The immunity also applies to other high-ranking State
officials in varying degrees, which this memorandum will address in Section IV(B) on page 26
below. The doctrine of head of State immunity is hereinafter referred to as “State official
immunity.”
Customary international law recognizes State official immunity through evidence of
widespread state practice and opinio juris. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) first
applied the doctrine in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, upholding an incumbent Minister of
Foreign Affairs’ immunity from criminal jurisdiction in the courts of Belgium.22 The UN
subsequently adopted the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property (“UNCISP”)23 in 2004 to create a uniform rule of law concerning the topic, where it
recognizes State official immunity as an “accepted. . .principle of customary international law.”
24

National courts are unable to prosecute, bring civil suit, or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over

State officials based on the doctrine. However, as the Arrest Warrant case points out, the
doctrine of State immunity does not apply in international criminal tribunals or courts.25

21

Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State Immunity: the Defined Rights of Kings, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179 (1989) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 3 (Feb. 14)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004, Official Records of
the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/59/49) (Not yet in force). The UNCISP requires
30 States to ratify the treaty and currently the convention has 28 State signatories and 10 State parties. The United
Nations Treaty Collection, “Databases,” UN Chapter III Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular
Relations, Etc., 13. United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Status as
at: 04-11-2010 01:16:12 EDT, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsg_no=III13&chapter=3&lang=en [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61 (Feb.
14) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

20

21
A.

Vertical and Horizontal Models of State Cooperation with Courts

The cooperation of States and their leaders is crucial to the successful administration of
justice in any international criminal tribunal or court. There are two models for State
cooperation with international tribunals and courts: the horizontal and the vertical models. The
horizontal model is based on the sovereign equality of the states, where a foreign State seeking
to subject an individual to its jurisdiction must rely on treaties of judicial cooperation or on
voluntary interstate cooperation.26 Absent an agreement or voluntary cooperation, a State may
not subject another State or its protected officials to its jurisdiction. This model inspires bilateral
or multilateral treaties on judicial cooperation or extradition between States. In the horizontal
model, the State requested to perform investigative or judicial acts to assist criminal proceedings
in the requesting State operates through its own judicial authorities and delivers the result to the
requesting State.27 A well-accepted ground for State immunity under the horizontal model is the
“independence and equality of the States,” expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium meaning “one sovereign State is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State,”
presumably because that State lacks the competence to exercise such jurisdiction.28
Under the vertical model, international tribunals and courts have the power to bind States
and their officials to comply with orders without a specific agreement or the State’s voluntary

26

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for
Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 47 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 29 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
27

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Annual Report 2009-2010, Antonio Cassese, President of the STL available at
http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/presidents_reports/Annual_report_March_2010_EN.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
FOX, supra note 18, at 57; The notion of a State’s lack of competence to exercise jurisdiction over another state
was recognized by the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Codification of International Law.
Publications of the League of Nations, V:Legal (1927); V.9 No. 11 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
7].
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compliance.29 Rather, international tribunals created under the powers of the United Nations
Security Council have the power to issue binding orders on States and their officials with the
consequence that any non-compliance can be sanctioned.30 States may not refuse to comply with
any of the tribunal’s requests on the grounds usually applicable in inter-State legal disputes.31 A
properly set up international tribunal requires no further consent to create jurisdiction over States
and their nationals. No international tribunal or hybrid court to date has had difficulty
prosecuting State officials under its jurisdiction. If the substantive law of a tribunal excludes any
defense based on head of State status, then the individual’s status of the capacity of their acts is
not relevant to bar the court’s jurisdiction for prosecuting the official’s crimes.32 International
Tribunals since Nuremburg expressly provide that “the official position as head of State…shall
not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”33 This
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Oct. 29 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
31

Id.

32
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memorandum will also show that international and hybrid tribunals may use the vertical model to
subpoena State official witnesses in Section V.

B.

The STL Uses Both Vertical and Horizontal Models

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon uses a hybrid of the horizontal and vertical models.
The vertical model governs the STL’s relationship with Lebanon, requiring full compliance
without undue delay with all the Tribunals requests and Article 4(1) granting the Tribunal
primacy over the Lebanese Criminal Court.34 The STL may take investigative acts without the
assistance of the Lebanese prosecutorial or judicial authorities under Article 11(5) of the Statute.
The Statute also provides enforcement mechanisms if Lebanon fails to comply with the
Tribunal’s requests. Article 20 of the Statute remedies non-compliance in a three-tier manner:
first, the STL President consults with the relevant Lebanese authorities; second, the Pre-Trial
Judge or Trial Chamber may make a judicial finding of non-cooperation; and third, the President
of the STL may report the judicial finding to the Security Council for further action. The Statute
also enables the Prosecutor to investigate Lebanese authorities, which includes on-site
investigations or interviewing witnesses or suspects under Article 11(5). Article 77(B) mitigates
the Prosecutor’s investigative authorities with Lebanon by requiring the Prosecutor to get PreTrial Judge authorization for investigative acts without assistance from Lebanese National
authorities.
The horizontal model governs the STL relationship with third States. States are only
required to comply with the STL’s requests if the State is under an agreement to do so with the
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Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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STL under rules 13, 14, and 15.35 Under Rule 21(A), non-compliance by third States who have
entered into an agreement is resolved by the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in the
relevant agreement. Third States who have not formed an agreement with the STL are not bound
to cooperate with the STL. The President of the Tribunal under Rule 21(B) may consult with the
competent authorities of the State in order to secure their cooperation. Considering the
foreseeable difficulty of obtaining Third Party State compliance, the STL Rules of Procedure and
Evidence facilitate the formation of third State agreements allowing the President, (Rule 13),
Prosecutor (Rule 14), the Head of Defense Office (Rule 15), and the Registrar acting under the
authority of the STL President (Rule 39) to directly seek cooperation from any State.36
The STL may have issues prosecuting and issuing subpoenas to third States’ officials
because of the horizontal model it shares with those States. The STL will however have full
authority to exercise jurisdiction over Lebanon. This memo will discuss the law of State official
under both the vertical and horizontal models. It will then discuss the STL’s best arguments for
obtaining State cooperation with witness subpoenas under both models.

35

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, STL/BD/2009/01, (March 20, 2009) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
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See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Annual Report 2009-2010, Antonio Cassese, President of the STL available at
http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/presidents_reports/Annual_report_March_2010_EN.pdf
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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IV.

Doctrine of State Official Immunity
A.

Personal Immunity (ratione personae) and Functional Immunity (ratione
materiae)

Ratione personae relates to the individual’s official status and applies only to a limited
categories of high ranking State officials while serving in office.37 Ratione personae is a broad
form of immunity that protects the individual from jurisdiction for any crimes he or she may
commit while in office. The immunity does not apply once the individual no longer holds
office.38 (The specific categories of high-ranking officials are outlined in section IV(B) of this
memo). Once the individual leaves office and no longer enjoys ratione personae immunity, a
more limited immunity analysis applies: ratione materiae.
Ratione Materiae protects the State official’s official acts carried out as a part of his or
her official duties for his or her State. The immunity applies while the State official is in office
and when he or she leaves office because it protects the official act itself.39 It requires an
analysis of whether the person committed a private act, for which there would be no immunity,
or a public, official or governmental act for which there is immunity from civil and criminal
jurisdiction.40

FOX, supra note 18, at 666 (citing Watts “The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of State, Heads of
Government and Foreign Ministers”, R de C, 242 (1994-III) at 13.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
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(1999) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
39
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Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 835, 863 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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B.

Scope of State Official Immunity

State official immunity applies to either the ratione materiae or ratione personae (or both
when applicable) immunities granted to State officials from a National court’s jurisdiction based
on the horizontal model of State cooperation. State officials who are immune from a National
court’s jurisdiction are not immune at international tribunals and courts, however, based on the
vertical model developed through customary international law and supported at all international
tribunals and recent ICJ decisions.41 The International Court of Justice recognized State official
immunity for Congo’s Foreign Minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi and thereby established a
framework for deciding Head of State and State official immunity in the Arrest Warrant Case.42
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian investigating judge issued an international arrest warrant
against Congo’s Foreign Minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi in absentia accusing him of
crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols for delivering speeches inciting racial hatred.43 Belgium justified its
actions stating that it was asserting universal jurisdiction to try international crimes and that
Belgium did not recognize immunity for State officials.44 The Democratic Republic of Congo, in
protest of the arrest warrants validity under international law brought the case to the International
Court of Justice for review.45 At the same time, Belgium was considering whether to put Israeli

41

See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 3 (Feb.
14) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9] and Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France) Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. ¶ 194 (June 4) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 23].
42

See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61
(Feb. 14) (recognizing the immunity of Yerodia) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
43

Id. at ¶ 13.
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Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.
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Id. at ¶ 17.
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Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and Iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein on
trial for crimes against humanity.46
The International Court of Justice determined that it “has been unable to deduce from
[recent State] practice that there exists under customary international law any form of exception
to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.”47 The court recognized that the performance of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs’ functions “is frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a
position freely to do so whenever the need should arise” without being exposed to legal liability
or criminal punishment.48
The ICJ recognized four exceptions to a head of State’s immunity under international
law:
1)

The head of State is not immune under international law from process in his or
her own country;

2)

The head of State’s home country may waive the official’s immunity in foreign
courts;

3)

A former head of State is not immune for acts committed before or after his
period on office or for private acts committed while in office; and

4)

The head of State has no immunity when the immunity has been validly abrogated
by and international tribunal.49

State practice has generally accepted the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant Case jurisprudence.50 The ICJ
applied its analysis of the Foreign Affairs Minister’s immunity to other high-ranking State

46

Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats for Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 65 DUKE L.J. 651,
664 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61 (Feb.
14) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]
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Id. at ¶ 55.
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Id. at ¶ 61.
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officials stating: “it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain
holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and
criminal.”51 This memo will use the ICJ’s analysis in the Arrest Warrant Case and its four
exceptions to immunity in discussing all State officials who have immunity below.
1.

Heads of State
a.

Current Status of Head of State Immunity

The Head of State enjoys immunity from jurisdiction in both its public capacity as a
“State” (ratione personae) and from the actions committed under the official position itself
(ratione materiae).52 The UNCISP and many national statutes include the head of State in the
definition of a State,53 thereby directly extending the State’s Immunity to the head of State. Even
heads of State who are merely ceremonial leaders are also treated as the State and are entitled to
immunity in some national jurisdictions.54 The purpose of granting heads of State immunity is to
(1) recognize an appropriate degree of respect for foreign leaders as a symbol of their State’s
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See Michael A. Tunks, supra note 40, at 665 (noting that Belgium no longer takes the position that putting a
foreign head of State on trial is justified under international law and has declared the case against Ariel Sharon
inadmissible) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61 (Feb.
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capacity.” United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004, Official
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religious, spiritual leaders, or rulers or particular peoples may enjoy immunity, citing the US treatment of the Pope
as the “head of the Vatican State,” however; such treatment is not widespread [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 7].
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sovereignty, and (2) ensure that State leaders are not inhibited from performing their State
functions.55

b.

Indentifying the Head of State

The relevant factors for determining whether an individual is entitled to Head of State
immunity are (1) the method of the individual’s acquisition of power 56, (2) evidence that the
individual actually exercised power57, and (3) the individual’s receipt of implicit or explicit
recognition as the Head of State from other States and their leaders.58

1)

Acquisition of Power

The ICJ has granted immunity for heads of State who can prove that they are either de
jure or de facto heads of State.59 De jure heads of State include constitutionally elected
presidents or prime ministers, reigns to throne and those heads of State holding their position by
right or according to law. De facto Heads of State attain power through non-legal means, for
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Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats for Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-of-State Immunity, 65 DUKE L.J. 651,
654 (2002) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
56

Id. at 17.

United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp.1507 (S.D. Fla., 1999) (holding that “being the strong man behind a
governmental apparatus formally held by others does not amount to a position of de facto Head of State” and
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[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
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INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS, Case Western Reserve University School of Law War Crimes Research Project
17-32 (2003) (citing Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Directorate of International Law, Recognition of
States and Governments, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch (Switzerland 2000)) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26].
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example a leader chosen to run a country after a military coup.60 The analysis of the Noriega
case below describes an example of de facto Head of State immunity.

2)

Actual exercise of power

Regardless of how the head of State acquires power, he or she must actually exercise it
over a substantial part of the State and its population. De facto Heads of State enjoy immunity
by exercising sovereign authority over a substantial part of a territory and over most of the
administrative apparatus.61 For de facto heads of State, courts grant immunity only to rulers who
directly exercise power. In United States v. Noriega62, the United States Appeals Court denied
immunity to General Manuel Noriega in part because “Noriega never served as the constitutional
leader of Panama,. . .[and] Panama has not sought immunity for Noriega.”63 In 1988, a power
struggle for Head of State in Panama ensued when Panama’s President Eric Arturo Delvalle
removed Noriega from his position has commander of Panama’s defense forces.64 Noriega took
control after a disputed presidential election. The United States did not recognize Noriega as
head of State, and instead recognized Guillermo Endara as the legitimate constitutional Head of
State.65 After Noriega declared a state of war with the United States in December 1989, the U.S

60
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Id. (citing Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Directorate of International Law, Recognition of States
and Governments, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch (Switzerland 2000)).
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U.S. v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997) ( In Noriega, the United States convicted General Noriega for
crimes including distribution of cocaine and affirmed that the defendant was properly denied immunity from
prosecution for the drug-related offenses based on head-of state immunity) [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 27].
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responded with military force in order to seize him.66 The lower court held that being a
“strong man” behind a governmental apparatus held by others does not amount to a position of
de facto head of State.67 This memorandum discusses the three separate Pinochet holdings in
Section IV(C)(2) on page 47 below in support finding that treaties could serve as a governmental
waiver to State official immunity under the first out of four exceptions to State immunity
discussed in the Arrest Warrant Case. Pinochet also involved a de facto head of State claiming
State official immunity.

3)

Recognition of Head of State authority from other States

A foreign State's implicit or explicit recognition that an individual is the head of State is a
strong indication that that person will enjoy immunity. In United States v. Noriega,68 the court
denied immunity to General Manuel Noriega in part because the “United States government
never recognized Noriega as Panama’s legitimate, constitutional leader.”69 As mentioned in the
immediately preceding section, the United States instead recognized Guillermo Endara as the
legitimate constitutional Head of State. The Court determined that the former General Manuel
Noriega or Panama could not be afforded immunity for two reasons. First, he was not
recognized as a head of State and was discharged from his position when the case began.

66
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U.S. v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp 1506, 1520-21 (S.D.Fla. 1990) (“The ‘head of state’ argument comes to the Court
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Second, the court found that his crime of narcotics trading would not be considered an activity
under the official capacity of a high-ranking official.70

3)

Government Ministers

Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction.71 In
Arrest Warrant, the ICJ declared that
a Minister of Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or her State’s
relations with all other States, occupies a position such that, like the Head of
State, or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international law
as representative of the State solely by virtue of his of her office. He or she does
not have to present letters of credence.72
The court further noted that there was no distinction between actions committed in an “official
capacity” and those performed in a “private capacity.”73 The Vienna Convention on Treaties,
Article 7(2) also recognizes that the Minister of Foreign Affairs represents the State and has the
authority to perform all acts relating to a treaty without production of full powers.74

4)

Other Ministers
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Ministers of the State are not afforded immunity unless their position is specified as
immune under international treaty or an ICJ decision.75 Recently, the ICJ decided in Djibouti v.
France that a Head of National Security does not enjoy immunity because there were no grounds
in international law upon which such official could claim immunity, citing that the position was
not that of a diplomat or other official protected in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961 and the Convention on Special Missions of 1969.76
In Djibouti v. France, a dispute between the two countries arose in relation to France’s
cooperation with the investigation into the death of the French Judge Bernard Borrel in Djibouti
in 1995. Djibouti sought enforcement of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation signed by the
two States on June 27, 1977 and the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
between France and Djibouti, dated September 27, 1986 in order to obtain documentation and
witness testimony from France’s head of National Security. The ICJ found that France did
violate the treaty and therefore had to give Djibouti reasons for its refusal to cooperate, that
Djibouti could not subpoena the head of State, but that Djibouti could subpoena the Head of
National Security. The ICJ affirmed the long standing rule that a head of State did enjoy
immunity from another State’s jurisdiction, but seemed to apply a narrower standard for other
high ranking officials, requiring some basis in treaty or international law before granting such
immunity.77
The ICJ in Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium enumerated positions that receive
immunity protections: “certain holders of high ranking office in a State, such as the Head of
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State, Head of Government, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction
in other States, both civil and criminal” suggesting that the list is not exhaustive.78 The court did
not indicate what other officials have immunity. It appears the Djibouti v. France narrowed the
scope of immunity.

5.

Diplomats

Diplomats enjoy extensive privileges and immunities under international law for the
diplomat’s mission in the receiving State.79 The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (“VCDR”) is the principle codification of their immunities.80 A diplomat in post
enjoys both ratione materiae and ratione personae immunity and is protected from both criminal
and civil liability while in office. However, once the diplomat is out of office, a municipal court
might prosecute him or her for private acts committed with criminal intent.81 Diplomats have
immunities in the “receiving State” they visit, which accepts their credentials as diplomats or
they receive immunities when they are experts on mission.82
VCDR divides immunity into three categories and gives degrees of immunity on a
descending scale of protection to (1) the diplomatic staff, (2) the administrative and technical
staff, and (3) the service staff.
a.

The diplomatic staff gets immunity to his person, property, residence, and
immunity from criminal and civil proceedings, and execution provided he or she
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is not a national or permanent resident of the receiving State.83 Diplomats also
enjoy, among other protections, exemptions from personal service.84 All
immunities also apply to the diplomat’s family who form a part of his or her
household, as long as they are also not nationals of the receiving State.
b.

The administrative and technical staff and their family members who constitute
part of their household in the receiving State have immunity (provided they are
not nationals of the receiving State) from criminal jurisdiction, but no civil
jurisdiction for actions outside of their official duties.85

c.

The service staff and not their families are immune only from criminal and civil
jurisdiction for acts performed in the course of their duties.86

The immunities accorded to diplomats exist regardless of an armed conflict.87 In the event of a
disruption of diplomatic relations, States typically entrust residual diplomatic functions in order
to preserve protective powers. The Diplomat loses immunity on the termination of his or her
office (ratione personae) but retains immunity ratione materiae for acts conducted on behalf of
the State while serving in the official position.88
A diplomat’s immunity likely only applies in the receiving State and not to third States
who have not consented to the diplomat’s presence in the receiving State.89 In The Former
Syrian Ambassador, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled (1) that there was no rule of
customary international law granting diplomats continuing immunity under Article 39(2) of the
83
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VCDR from jurisdiction from third States and (2) that there was no rule in customary
international law requiring the Federal Republic of Germany to recognize diplomatic immunity
formerly accredited by the German Democratic Republic.
The Former Syrian Ambassador dealt with a warrant issued for the arrest of a former
ambassador for charges of assisting in murder and bringing about an explosion in West Berlin
when in 1983, a bomb set off in an arts center killed one person and seriously injured 20 people.
The Ambassador was allegedly implicated in the attacks and allegedly failed to prevent the
terrorist group from removing a bag of explosives from the Syrian Embassy. The Federal
Constitutional Court upheld the warrant. Although it found that the acts were performed in the
course of the diplomat’s official functions (because he acted according to instructions
telegraphed from his sending State),90 Germany, as a third State, was not under any obligation to
respect the immunity ratione materiae of the former diplomat. The Court found that the
immunity is based on consent of the receiving State in the form of an agreement granting
reciprocal obligations to the diplomat and receiving State. The Court determined that consent
“legalizes the personal as well as functional diplomatic immunity.”91 This diplomat did not have
such consent.

6.

Constituent States

Debate whether Constituent States are entitled to immunity is unresolved. Constituent
States are territorial and constitutional entities forming part of a sovereign State. A constituent
State holds administrative jurisdiction over a defined geographic territory and is a form of
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regional government. The UNCISP includes in its definition of a State the “constituent units of a
federal State or political subdivisions of the State, which are entitled to perform acts in the
exercise of sovereign authority, and are acting in that capacity.”92 International case law is
divided between granting administrative portions of a State immunity by affiliation with the
State, and denying immunity unless the constituent has its own legal personality in its foreign
relations with other countries.93
In Van Heynigen v. Netherlands Indies Government94, the defendant was an
administrative body of the government that claimed it derived its power from the Netherland’s
government from a letter by the Dutch Department of External Affairs. The Austrian High Court
found that the Dutch East Indies Company did have immunity because it was “a part of a foreign
sovereign State.”95 Judge Philipps opined that “where a foreign sovereign sets up as an organ of
its government a governmental control of part of its territory which it creates into a legal entity,. .
. the legal entity cannot be sued…because that would mean the authority and territory of a
foreign sovereign would be subjected in the ultimate result to the jurisdiction and execution of
this court.”96
A French court followed the Van Heynigen reasoning in Neger v. Land of Hesse. The
court denied immunity to a constituent of West Germany on the ground that immunity could
only benefit “sovereign States…and not…member States of a federation which are under the
92
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supervision of the central government.”97 The court found that immunity would only apply to an
entity with its own personality such that it can conduct foreign relations with other countries.
The European Convention on State Immunity of 1972 determined that Constituent
States are not entitled immunity ratione personae but that they might enjoy immunity ratione
materiae.98 The Convention provides that a contracting State may include a declaratory notice to
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that for the purposes of the Convention, the
Constituent State is entitled to the same obligations as the contracting State.99 Service of
documents must go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the federal State.100
British and French courts do not grant immunity to political subdivisions, municipalities,
or regional autonomous districts because they lack the individual authority to engage in foreign
relations.101 The United States, however includes political subdivisions and “all government
units beneath the central government including local government but not cities or towns” in the
definition of a “State” for the purposes of immunity in Article 1603 of the FSIA.102

7.

State Agencies
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State Agencies are likely immune from criminal and civil jurisdiction if the entity (1)
does not have a legal personality separate from the State103 and (2) is entitled to perform and
performs public acts under the authority of the State.104 In other words, agencies and
instrumentalities are accorded immunity based on their status and performance under State
authority. However, there is no international consensus on how to evaluate which agencies or
instrumentalities have immunity.
State agencies are entities that enable a State to participate in commercial and economic
activities.105 Examples of State agencies are sub-units of government departments, public
corporations established by charter or decree, or companies established under private law in
which the government is a majority shareholder.106
The UNCISP includes agencies or instrumentalities “or other entities, to the extent that
they are entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign
authority of the State.”107 The commentary to the UNCISP explain that the term “other entities”
covers situations where the State entrusts a private entity with governmental authority to perform
public acts, such as a commercial bank dealing with import and export licensing.108 Determining
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whether the agency’s acts are in the exercise of sovereign authority is a question of fact
determined by the national court of the State agency.
In the Empire of Iran, the German court held that a contract for the repair of embassy
premises was not in the essential sphere of State authority.109 The court determined that while
State immunity requires a look at customary international law, “qualification of State activity as
sovereign or non-sovereign must in principle be made by national law, since international law, at
least usually, contains no criteria for this distinction.”110 However the court restricted the
national law inquiry to “international law restrictions,” stating that “[n]ational law can only be
employed to distinguish between a sovereign and non-sovereign activity of a foreign State
insofar as it cannot exclude from the sovereign sphere, and thus from immunity, such State
dealings as belong to its field of State authority in the narrow and proper sense, according to the
predominantly held views of the States.”111 Therefore, courts will evaluate the two prongs
(status and performance) using a mix of both international and national law.
The International Law Commission (ILC) Working Group enumerates several factors to
consider in determining the first prong: status of the agency. The factors courts will consider in
determining the status of the agency are (1) independence from the sovereign, (2) linkage to the
State either by being a subdivision or by having a majority of shares owned by the State, (3) the
performance of functions traditionally performed by an initial government operating within the
States boundaries, (4) separate legal personality, (5) the core function of the entity being either
an integral part of the State (like armed forces) or predominantly commercial, (6) performance of
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core public functions, (7) active supervision of the entity, (8) employees hired in accordance with
public employment conditions, and (9) the agency’s constitution, powers, duties, and source of
funding.112
Factors that courts will likely not consider are: (1) the opinion of the foreign State or its
Ambassador and, (2) the conferment of separate legal personality under the law of the foreign
State. The greater the divergence of the agency from the political organization of the State and
the greater its enjoyment of a separate legal personality, the closer the State agency is to being
considered a private corporation and therefore not entitled to State immunity.113 Further, the
establishment of private market forms weakens the presumption of the State agency’s status as a
part of the State.114 The determining factor becomes the extent to which the State retains control
and the nature of the agency’s acts.115 State agency actions may be protected under the Act of
State doctrine, except where the acts constitute a breach of international human rights or other
clearly established international law.116
Courts will evaluate the second prong, performance, by looking at the entitlement to
perform such acts under State authority. Such evaluation must look to the State’s national law
because it requires analysis on the circumstances by which the entity is established and acquires
its power. Determining, next, whether the agency actually performed those duties, the court
must evaluate the categorization of those acts as “public” under the authority of the State’s laws.
This prong uses the Empire of Iran analysis which determined that international standards could
112
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trump the State’s agency laws, holding that “international law restrictions” identified State
agency activities as performed in the sovereign sphere and therefore entitled to immunity.117
Some jurisdictions automatically grant State agencies immunity. The United States uses
this approach and it is codified in 1976 FSIA section 1603(a) stating that a political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality is immune upon three conditions (1) separate legal entity, (2) a close
link with the State, and (3) no incorporation in a third State.

8.

Employment Contracts

Analysis of immunity for actions committed under contractual agreements with the State
is similar to the analysis for State agency immunity claims. Some jurisdictions grant absolute
immunity to State employees treating those agreements as different from private contracts.
International law recognizes a general rule that protects the internal administration of the State
allowing the State to designate individuals to act on its behalf. The ICTY supported this method
in the Blaskic case stating “[i]t is well known that customary international law protects the
internal organization of each sovereign State; it leaves to each sovereign State to determine its
internal structure and in particular to designate the individuals acting as State organs or
agents.”118 However the Appeals Chamber applied this standard to State officials acting in their
official capacity rather than to private contracting parties.119
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The more common State practice is to cautiously apply the two-prong status and
performance test outlined in Section IV(B)(6) State Agencies above. The UNCISP codified the
general State practice in Article 11, Contracts of Employment, allowing immunity only in certain
circumstances of employment. The convention provides
1.

Unless otherwise agreed between the States concerned, a State cannot invoke
immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise
competent in a proceedings which relates to a contract of employment between
the State and an individual for work performed or to be performed, in whose or in
part, in the territory of that other State.

2.

Paragraph 1 does not apply if:
a. The employee has been recruited to perform particular functions in the
exercise of governmental authority;
b. The employee is
i. Diplomatic agent
ii. Consular officer
iii. Person on Special Mission
iv. Any other person enjoying diplomatic immunity…120

Like the State agency analysis, the UNCISP article requires both that the employee has an
official status and performs “particular functions in the exercise of governmental authority.”121
The court should determine the duties of the employee that constitute participation in the
exercise of government power. However, there is a risk of unequal treatment because nations
with large public sectors may enjoy a disproportionately wide immunity for State actions. One
proposition is that the powers exercised in public service should be for the protection of general
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interests, like powers relating to policing, defense of the State, administration of justice, and
assessment to tax.122
Some countries have limited the scope of government employee immunity. The German
Federal Labour Court found that where an employee’s administrative task is concerned with “a
core area of sovereignty” like issuing passports and visas, the employment dispute is immune.123
However, merely having access to confidential information is not sufficient to warrant immunity.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal determined that the confidential nature of the work of an interpreter
was not a ground for immunity just as it is not in the case of subordinate positions like those of
secretaries, typists, archivists, chauffeurs and security men.124

9.

Consular immunity for special missions

Consuls and their staff are entitled to ratione materiae immunity from suit in respect to
their official acts, but not in respect of their private acts. The law is codified in the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations 1963. Case law too determines that consul’s actions that are
not in the scope of employment are not immune. In Gerristen v. de la Madrid Hurtado, the court
determined that kidnapping and assault were not acts within an official's functions even though
the acts committed were for the purpose of interfering with the distribution of leaflets outside the
Mexican Consulate.125 States may give consuls additional immunities through a bilateral
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agreement, as the United Kingdom and China did in their UK/China Consular Agreement of
1984.126 Consuls may obtain the broader diplomatic immunity if the sending State has no
diplomat in post and if the receiving State gives consent.127

10.

Armed Forces

Immunities granted to armed forces vary depending on bilateral and multilateral
agreements established for visiting armed forces and the treatment of armed forces in national
legislation.128 Visiting troops in a foreign State upon the State’s consent are typically granted
immunity under customary international law subject to limitations in agreements between the
visiting and receiving States.129 Military authorities of the force typically have exclusive
jurisdiction in matters concerning discipline and the internal administration of the force.130

C.

Exceptions to State Official Immunity

As discussed in Section IV(B) at page 25 above, the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant case decision
recognized four exceptions to a head of State’s immunity under international law:
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1)

the head of State is not immune under international law from process in his or her
own country;

2)

the head of State’s home country may waive the official’s immunity in foreign
courts;
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3)

a former head of State is not immune for acts committed before or after his period
on office or for private acts committed while in office; and

4)

the head of State has no immunity when the immunity has been validly abrogated
by and international tribunal.131

These four exceptions are discussed in depth in Heather Ludwig’s Memorandum to the
Prosecutor for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon entitled “STL: Would an Accused or Witness
Who is a State Official be Able to Claim Immunity from Prosecution Before the STL? If so,
What Type of Immunity and What Would the Consequences of Such a Successful Claim be?”
beginning on page 27 of her Memorandum.132 This section of the memorandum will briefly
highlight Heather Ludwig’s key points under each exception and will discuss additional
arguments that the STL Prosecutor may make under each of the four exceptions to State official
immunity.

1.

Waiver of immunity in a State’s own courts

The waiver of immunity in a State’s own courts is not entirely applicable to the STL
because the STL is not a Lebanese tribunal and officials from third States will not be tried under
that State’s jurisdiction.133 Article 4 of the Tribunal’s Statute explicitly separates the STL from
Lebanese national courts, indicating that the two courts will have concurrent jurisdiction but that
the STL will have primacy over the national courts of Lebanon. Lebanon has effectively waived
131
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immunity because the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence require extensive cooperation
from Lebanon and it’s officials. As discussed above in Section III(B) the STL’s relationship
with Lebanon is governed by the vertical model requiring full compliance without undue delay
with all the Tribunals requests and Article 4(1) granting the Tribunal primacy over the Lebanese
Criminal Court. However, Lebanon’s requirement to cooperate with the STL fits better under
the forth exception to State official immunity, indicating that State officials have no immunity at
international tribunals.

2.

Waiver of immunity in foreign courts

The second possible waiver to State official immunity is the government’s waiver of the
official’s immunity at foreign tribunals. The government may voluntarily consent to the foreign
court’s jurisdiction or may waive the immunity through a treaty or agreement. The waiver of
immunity for treaty-based crimes is limited to the provisions of the treaty and does not provide
universal jurisdiction for all crimes committed outside the prohibitions of the treaty.134 The
waiver will only be applicable if both States are a member to the treaty.
The House of Lords in the Pinochet case removed State official immunity from the
former Head of State because Chile had ratified the Torture Convention of 1988 and
consequently waived head of State immunity protections for the acts of torture.135 Pinochet was
decided after three decisions. At the Queen’s Bench trial, the court determined that Pinochet
was entitled to immunity even though the crimes were “crimes against humanity” because unlike
Nuremberg and the ICTY, the current tribunal violates the principle that a State will not implead
134
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another State in relation to its sovereign acts, whereas the international tribunals were formed
under an international agreement.136 The court determined that “a former head of State is clearly
entitled to immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of exercising public
functions.”137
A 3/2 majority of the appeals court in the November 1998 determined that acts
“condemned by international law” do not “amount to acts performed in the exercise of the
[official] function of a Heads of State.”138 The Court held that not holding these officials
accountable would be a travesty of international law and that State immunity only applied to acts
which international law recognized as being among the functions of a head of State. The Lords
disagreed between two extreme interpretations on the scope of head of State immunity for
international crimes.139 Lord Nicholls, Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffman ruled that official act did
not include torture or hostage taking. Lord Slynn and Bringham disagreed. Lord Slynn first
looked whether “the conduct was engaged under the colour of or in ostensible exercise of the
Head of State’s public authority.” If it was, he determined “it must be treated as official
conduct.” Although Lord Slynn found no basis in international law requiring that immunity be
denied, he recognized that an international convention that clearly establishes an international
crime, gives universal jurisdiction, and declares that immunity cannot be pleaded would
effectively strip immunity.140
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It was discovered that Lord Hoffman was the chairman and a director of Amnesty
International Charity Limited, which has been given permission to take part in the earlier hearing
before Lord Hoffman and four other Lords. The decision was not allowed to stand and there was
a new Appeal. The final appeal for Pinochet determined his ratione materiae immunity did not
protect him for the alleged acts of torture because (1) the Torture Convention provides
worldwide universal jurisdiction; (2) it requires all States to ban and outlaw torture; (3) torture is
a crime that must be committed “with the acquiescence of a public official” or a person acting in
“an official capacity” therefore applying to heads of State; and (4) allowing ratione materiae
immunity for torture would prevent all prosecution of the crime of torture.141 The Lords
determined he could only be extradited in respect to the torture charges relating to the period
after 8 December, 1988, when the British government had ratified an international agreement
making it an offense in the United Kingdom to commit torture abroad. Since Pinochet stepped
down as president of Chile in 1990, he could only be charged for crimes between 1988 and 1990.
Heather Ludwig discusses on page 74 in her Memorandum to the Prosecutor of the STL
that Syria’s ratification of several UN anti-terrorism treaties are evidence of a waiver of State
official immunities for the terrorist attacks through a treaty. Both Syria and Lebanon ratified the
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“ICSTB”), which
requires that all parties to the treaty criminalize certain types of conduct, surrender for
prosecution, or extradite people apprehended in national boundaries that are suspected of the
terrorist crimes, and assist in the investigation and trial of the crimes.142 She notes that while
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Syria will argue that nothing in the treaty addresses the waiver of immunity, the argument would
likely fail because the Torture Convention in Pinochet did not explicitly waive immunity claims
either. She notes that the purpose of the ICSTB was to facilitate the prevention, investigation,
and prosecution of terrorist attacks, explicitly providing a provision for extraditing individuals
responsible for the offenses. While the ICSTB also contains a provision that would allow Syria
to prosecute the terrorists before its own courts, Heather Ludwig argues that STL prosecutor still
may be able to access Syrian State officials by arguing that the Syrian prosecutions would be
inadequate.

3.

A former head of State is not immune for acts committed before or
after his period in office or for private acts committed while in office

Former State official’s claims to immunity are susceptible to two exceptions to their
immunity. After a State official leaves office, he or she may be tried for acts committed outside
the scope of the official’s State duties. Additionally, the former State official will not be
afforded immunity for acts committed before or after the official’s term in office. Heather
Ludwig’s memorandum to the STL Prosecutor discusses both immunities in detail starting on
page 81.

4.

Absence of State immunity at international courts and tribunals

The last exception to State official immunity occurs when an international court or
tribunal prosecutes the accused. A detailed analysis of this argument is in Heather Ludwig’s
Memorandum to the STL Prosecutor on page 28 of her Memorandum. The Nuremberg Tribunal
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first eliminated State official immunity stating, “crimes against international law are committed
by men, and not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced.”143 The Arrest Warrant case upheld the
notion that State officials have no immunity at international tribunals stating that “certain
international criminal courts” may try State officials when those courts have jurisdiction.144 The
court did not define what “international criminal courts” were but clearly distinguished them
from “foreign jurisdiction[s]” and courts of “one State.”145
a.

STL’s International Character

Heather Ludwig’s Memorandum to the STL Prosecutor goes further to identify three
factors in determining whether the STL is considered an international criminal court analyzing 1)
the authority vested to the court, 2) the characteristics of the court, and 3) the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court.146 She analyzes the level of authority vested to the STL by looking at
the mode of establishment noting that the STL’s formation under the UN’s Chapter VII powers
suggests it is primarily an international tribunal. However, her memorandum points out that the
formation of a tribunal through a bilateral treaty affords the court no enforcement powers for
orders or requests outside of Lebanon.147 The STL’s capabilities of enforcing orders will be
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discussed in the Section V below analyzing a State’s potential immunity from witness subpoena
orders at International courts.
Heather Ludwig’s memorandum continues to analyze the STL’s history of establishment,
the judicial composition, the location and Court Headquarters, and the subject matter of the STL
to conclude that the STL is characteristically similar to international hybrid tribunals, but hedges
her declaration that the Tribunal is international by noting that “terrorism is not a universally
recognized “international” crime and has never been the sole subject matter jurisdiction basis of
an international tribunal. Essentially, the question of the STL’s international character will likely
be determined based on it’s subject matter jurisdiction because the authority vested in the court
and the characteristics of the court are predominantly international.148
b.

Terrorism as an international crime

The STL’s subject matter jurisdiction is for the crime of terrorism and other crimes and
offenses against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failures to report crimes and
offenses as defined only by the Lebanese Penal Code.149 The STL’s prosecution of crimes
interpreted solely under “domestic” law may hinder the Tribunal’s ability to circumvent State
official immunity. Historically, no other international court or Tribunal has tried only domestic
crimes, while the SCSL and ECCC have prosecuted domestic crimes. If the acts of terrorism
being tried at the STL are considered international in nature, then the STL will likely be able to
exercise jurisdiction over States and their officials.
Refer to Heather Ludwig’s memorandum starting from page 57 where she discusses at
length whether terrorism is an international crime. Her memorandum looks at the definitions of
148
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the Lebanese Penal Code defining terrorism as those activities “intended to create a State of
panic committed by using such means as explosives, inflammable materials, toxic or incendiary
products, and infectious and microbial agents that cause public danger.”150 Her memorandum
then discusses whether terrorism is an independent international crimes defined by treaty or
customary international law. She goes through the 1926 International Congress of Penal Law’s
recommendation to internationally criminalize threats to world peace, the 1937 Conference for
the Repression of Terrorism, the 1994 General Assembly Resolution on “Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism noting that several multi-lateral anti-terrorism conventions exist that
focus on the domestic enforcement of terrorism through international cooperation.
1) UN Resolution 1373
The Security Council issued Resolution 1373 under it’s Chapter VII powers enforcing
that “every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts.” The Resolution requires that all States “criminalize the
funding of terrorist groups or acts,”151 and “[e]nsure that any person who participates” in any
aspect of terrorism “is brought to justice.”152 The Resolution requires that all States make
terrorist acts “serious criminal offenses in domestic laws and regulations” thereby creating a
widespread State practice of criminalizing terrorism. The 1373 Resolution’s mandate in addition
to the numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties already in existence suggests that the two
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elements for customary international law are present 1) widespread State practice and 2) opinio
juris.
The Prosecutor can argue that the STL does prosecute an international crime because the
1373 Resolution suggests that terrorism is an internationally accepted crime. Further, the
prosecutor will argue that Resolution 1373 mandates that States provide “assistance in
connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings” relating to the prosecution of
terrorist acts, including “assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the
proceedings.” If Resolution 1373 is indeed binding on all Member States, then Syria must
comply by providing all the suspects and necessary witnesses to the STL for proper prosecution
of terrorism. There is, however, some controversy as to whether Resolution 1373 is indeed
binding on Member Parties. Keith White’s memorandum to the STL Prosecutor, issue 12,
discusses whether Resolution 1373 is binding at length and has been submitted to the STL for
review this November 2010.153
2) Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity
Refer to Heather Ludwig’s memorandum on page 66 where she discusses whether
terrorism is a crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity are criminal acts that equate to
“a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”154 The Security
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Council specifically agreed to remove crimes against humanity from the STL’s Statute155
although the Secretary General suggested that the attacks could be considered crimes against
humanity.156 Yet, considering the relatively small number of deaths (22) and injuries (about
500), and that the supposed intentions behind the attacks were “political destabilization” of the
State and not widespread attacks against the civilian population, it will be a tougher burden to
prove that the crimes are crimes against humanity.157 Terrorism as it occurred in Lebanon may be
a crime against humanity if the Prosecution can prove that the bombing was “expressly intended
to provoke terror in the civilian population or political structure of [the] nation.”158

V.

Immunity from Witness Subpoenas at International Tribunals
This Section will analyze the current law on whether international tribunals and courts

have the authority to subpoena heads of State or other State officials claiming immunity. The
section will review decisions from international and hybrid tribunals in making a comparative
analysis to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This section relies on the preceding section
analyzing State official immunity and determines whether State officials who have immunity as
determined above may avoid witness subpoenas at international tribunals.
Generally, international tribunals do have the authority to subpoena witness testimony
from State officials claiming immunity. As discussed in section III(B) above, international
155
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tribunals and courts have the power to bind States and their officials to comply with orders
without a specific agreement or the State’s voluntary compliance under the vertical model of
State cooperation with courts.159 States may not refuse to comply with any of the tribunal’s or
court’s requests on the grounds that are usually applicable in inter-State legal disputes.
Therefore, a properly set up international tribunal with the consent of relevant States requires no
further consent to create jurisdiction over States and their nationals.
In the recent Djibouti v. France decision, the ICJ determined that national courts may not
issue witness subpoenas to those State officials who have immunity under customary
international law presumably because of the horizontal relationship national jurisdiction have
with other States.160 As this section will show, international tribunals and courts have granted
their respective courts jurisdiction to issue witness subpoenas to State officials who would
normally enjoy State immunity protection based on the vertical relationship the courts have with
other States. The relevant factors for determining whether the tribunal or court is able to issue
subpoenas are:
1.

Whether the tribunal or court is primarily an international court;

2.

Whether the tribunal or court’s statute strips State official immunity for
prosecuting crimes under its jurisdiction; and

3.

A.

Nuremberg Trials
1.

159

Whether the tribunal has the authority to issue witness subpoenas.

Was Nuremberg an International or National Tribunal?

Id.
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The Nuremberg Trial was the first time an international tribunal prosecuted heads of
State and other State officials for international crimes. At the end of World War II, the victorious
Allies formed the International Military Tribunal to try Nazi German leaders on war crimes
charges. It is arguably the precedent for “the collective delegation through a treaty mix of
territorial and universal jurisdiction to an international criminal court.”161 The international
community outraged at the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, held the Nuremberg Trials
and prosecuted leaders who were responsible for egregious violations. Nuremberg established a
basic framework and precedent for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity
and was the basis of the formation of the subsequent international tribunals and courts. The
International Military Tribunals “were made up of rules of procedure tailored to that tribunal,
and differed markedly from most National procedural systems, probably being a composite of
several systems.”162 Nuremberg therefore was an international tribunal based on its formation
under the consent of the Allied nations, which later formed the United Nations, and its
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Professor Michael Scharf describes Nuremberg’s international character listing a number
of factors including it’s name (The International Military Tribunal), the Preamble’s reference
that the four Signatories are “acting in the interests of all the United Nations”; Article 5 of the
Agreement giving any government of the United Nations the right to adhere to the Agreement,
Article 6 of the Charter not limited the prosecution to German war criminals, Article 10 of the
Charter binding Tribunals decisions to Signatory countries, and noting that the Tribunal punished

161

Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 67, 103 (2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 55].
162
See Howard S. Levie, Prosecuting War Crimes Before an International Tribunal, 28 AKRON L. REV. n.429
(1995) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 56].

57

58
individuals for violations of international law163.

2.

Does Nuremberg’s statute eliminate State official immunity for
prosecution?

The Tribunal’s Charter specifically condoned the prosecution of war criminals stating:
The official position of defendants whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.164

The ICTY, ICTR, ICC, SCSL and ECCC later used a version of this provision in their own
Statutes. The Nuremberg judgment explained the basis for stripping State immunity:
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the action of sovereign
States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and further, where the act in
question is an act of State, those who carry it out are not personally responsible,
but are protected by the doctrine of sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. . . .The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances protects the representatives
of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind
their official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings. . . On the other hand, the very essence of the Charter is that
individuals have international duties, which transcend the national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if
the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence under international
law.165
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The quotation points out that Nuremberg indeed was a tribunal of international character,
suggesting that the vertical model prevailed and “transcended the national obligations…imposed
by the individual State.” Therefore, the Tribunal claimed superiority over a State’s immunity
claims.
3.

Did Nuremberg have the authority to subpoena witnesses?

Nuremberg’s Charter expressly granted the Tribunal the authority to subpoena witnesses.
Article 17 of the charter provides that the “Tribunal shall have the power…(a) to summon
witnesses to the Trial and to require their attendance and testimony and to put questions to
them.” Nuremberg had the authority to subpoena witnesses regardless of their official status
because the tribunal had a vertical relationship with States, the tribunal had the authority to
prosecute State officials and it had the express authority to summon and interrogate witnesses.

B.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

The ICTY determined in the Krstic case that it had the authority to issue witness
subpoenas to State officials based on the above three factors: the Tribunals international
character, its ability to prosecute State officials, and its ability to subpoena witnesses.166 The
Tribunal interpreted customary international law to allow subpoenas for State officials witness
testimony because
1) the State official immunity does not apply to international criminal tribunals;
2) the ICTY statute expressly strips State officials from immunity from prosecution; and
3) the requirement to send subpoenas to the State and not the individual State official only
applies to document production.
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 1 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia July 1, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
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1.

Is the ICTY a national or international tribunal?

The ICTY is an international ad hoc tribunal and does not have any national tribunal
characteristics. It is an international tribunal based on it’s a) creation, b) judicial composition, c)
funding, d) location, and e) its subject matter jurisdiction.

a.

ICTY’s Creation

The Security Council under their Chapter VII Powers in Resolution 827 created the ICTY
by a unanimous vote.167 This is a valid method of establishment for an international tribunal
because States may choose to prosecute suspected perpetrators of international crimes under
international criminal law before an international tribunal rather than an international court.168
The option to prosecute international crimes in such a manner is recognized in Article VI of the
Genocide Convention, the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and through the
Nuremberg Judgment.169
b.

ICTY’s Judicial Composition

All of the Judges at the ICTY ad hoc tribunal are international with no national judges
serving in Chambers.
c.

ICTY’s funding
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The ICTY receives funding in the same manner as other UN established program
activities because the ad hoc tribunal is a subsidiary body of the Security Council and reports
directly to it.170 The Member States of the UN fund the Tribunal and review its expenses. The
General Assembly budgetary body determines each Member State’s contribution.171
d.

ICTY’s location and headquarters

The ICTY is located among the principle judicial organs of the UN including the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands.172
The ICTY may have been placed there because the UN determined that the former Yugoslavia
was too war torn to be able to successfully hold an international tribunal.
e.

ICTY’s Subject matter jurisdiction

The ICTY has the subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute “persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law” pursuant to Article 1 of its Statute.173
Furthermore, the ICTY has the jurisdiction to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,174 violations of the laws and customs of war,175 genocide,176 and
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crimes against humanity.177 All the crimes the Tribunal prosecutes are international crimes and
they are expressly interpreted by international law standards.

2.

Does the ICTY’s Statute expressly eliminate State official immunity
for prosecution?

The ICTY Statute expressly strips State official immunity for the prosecution of criminals
under its jurisdiction. Article 7(2) of the Statute provides that “the official position of any
accused persons, whether as head of State or government or as responsible government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”178 The ICTY
decisions declare that the ICTY has such authority because it enjoys the vertical model of
interstate relations, as do all international tribunals.179

3.

Does the ICTY have the authority to issue witness subpoenas?

The ICTY has the express authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses in its RPE. Rule 54
of the RPE provides:
At the request of either party of proprio motu, a Judge or Trial Chamber may
issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be
necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of
the trial.180
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4.

The ICTY case law supports the conclusion that the ICTY may issue
witness subpoenas to State officials

The ICTY Appeals Chamber held that it is capable of issuing subpoenas to witnesses who
are heads of State or State officials in Prosecutor v. Krstic.181 This opinion overruled the
Prosecutor v. Blaskic182 opinion, which determined that the ICTY did not have the authority to
subpoena a State official for testimony regarding information gathered through his or her official
capacity. Each case will be discussed in turn.
a.

Prosecutor v. Blaskic

The Appeals Chamber183 in Blaskic determined (1) whether the ICTY could issue a
subpoena for official State documents to a State, (2) whether the Tribunal could issue a subpoena
to a high government official of the State, (3) whether claims of national security privilege must
be accepted, and (4) the appropriate remedies in the event of non-compliance. The Trial
Chamber issued subpoenas to the government of Croatia, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko
Susak, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the custodian of records of the former
Defense Ministry of Herceg-Bosna. Croatia disputed the International Tribunal’s authority to
issue the subpoena. At the trial level, the court determined that the Tribunal has the power to
issue binding orders both to States and private individuals.184 The Appeals Chambers disagreed.

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, Appeals Chamber, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia July 1, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
181

182

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for
Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
29 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook, tab 13].
183

The Appeals Chamber for the Blaskic decision consisted of Presiding Judge Antonio Cassese, Judge Adolphus
Karibi-Whyte, Judge Haopei Li, Judge Sir Ninian Stephen and Judge Lal Chand Vohrah. Presiding Judge Cassese
wrote the Blaskic opinion ,which decided that subpoenas could not be issued to State officials except under the
circumstances discussed above in this memorandum.
184

Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, Tr. Ch. II, Decision on the Objections of the Republic of Croatia to
the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum, 18 July 1997, reversed in part, affirmed in part in judgment on the Request

63

64
It outlined the following specific situations when the tribunal has the authority to issue
subpoenas to heads of State:
1) The tribunal may not issue binding orders (subpoenas) to current State officials or
State officials who at the relevant time of the subpoena were acting in their official
capacities.
2) The tribunal may issue binding orders (subpoenas) to State officials who at the
relevant time at issue in the subpoena were acting in a private capacity.
3) The Tribunal may issue binding orders (subpoenas) to individuals acting in their
private capacity.
The court based its decision on two determinations (1) its analysis of customary international law
in contrast with the rules of procedure in common law States and, (2) the lack of any provision in
the Statute of the Tribunal allowing subpoenas to State officials.185
First, the court contrasted nations where State organs, “including State officials, and the
Prime Minister or the Head of State…can be summoned to give evidence, can be compelled to
produce documents, can be requested to appear in court” based on the notion that “nobody, not
even the Head of State, is above the law.”186 The international community on the other hand
does not “possess the same powers which accrue to national courts” and therefore must use
customary international law in order to avoid applying a single nations principles in an
international tribunal. The Court determined that “[e]ach sovereign State has the right to issue
instructions to its organs, both those operating at the internal level and those operating in the
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field of international relations, and also to provide for sanctions or other remedies in case of noncompliance with those instructions.”187
Second, the Appeals Chambers found no provision in the ICTY statute granting the
tribunal authority to issuing subpoenas to State officials. The court first looked at Article 7(2),
which States “the official position of any accused persons, whether as head of State or
government or as responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”188 The court found that this provision was irrelevant
because it specifically addresses criminal responsibility rather than evidence gathering
procedures.189 Next, the court dismissed Article 18(2) stating “[t]he Prosecutor shall have the
power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site
investigations…[i]n carrying out these tasks, the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the
assistance of the State authorities concerned.”190 The Court determined that it would be
“fallacious to infer form a provision which simply lays down the power to seek assistance from a
State official, the existence of an obligation for such State official to cooperate.”191
Based on the above analysis, the court determined that “both under international law and
the Statute itself, Judges or Trial Chambers cannot address binding orders to State officials.”192
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Rather, the tribunal must request the documents or individual testimony directly from the
State.193
The Appeals Chamber next determined that the tribunal does not have the authority to
impose sanctions on States for non-compliance. The legal remedies for non-compliance are (1)
appealing to the State itself for enforcement by issuing a binding order pursuant to Article 29 of
the Statute to produce to information required (leaving it to the State to identify the person
responsible for providing the State’s compliance with that order)194 or (2) report the matter to the
Security Council.195 The Appeals Chamber explains the limitation in enforcement power by
stating “the International Tribunal does not possess any power to take enforcement measures
against States. Had the drafters of the Statute intended to vest the International Tribunal with
such a power, they would have expressly provided for it.”196
b.

Prosecutor v. Krstic

Six years later, the Appeals Chambers in Krstic directly disagreed with the Blaskic
decision on whether the Tribunal may subpoena witnesses. Radislav Krstic applied for
subpoenas to be issued to two prospective witnesses, requiring each of them to attend a location
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to give Krstic’s counsel the opportunity to interview them in

Oct. 29 1997) (determining that in order to obtain “the production of documents, the seizure or evidence, the arrest
of suspects, etc., being acts involving action by a State, its organs or officials, they must turn to the relevant State.”)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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recalcitrant State, under the conditions provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.).
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order to add evidence in support of his appeal against conviction.197 The issue of subpoenas
would be made under the Tribunal’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure, which provides:
At the request of either party or proprio motu, a Judge or Trial Chamber may
issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be
necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of
the trial.198

The Court determined that subpoenas may be issued to prospective witnesses to be interviewed
in anticipation of tendering that evidence on appeal if the appellant establishes there is (1) a
reasonable basis for his belief that there is a good change that the prospective witness give
information that (2) will materially assist in the appellant, and (3) that it is at least reasonably
likely that an order would produce the degree of cooperation needed for the defense to interview
the witness.199
Krstic disregarded much of the Blaskic decision’s analysis regarding witness testimony
because the Blaskic decision was “concerned with the production of documents” and not witness
testimony.200 The Appeals Chamber determined that “it is common place in law that, where the
documents to be produced are the documents of either a State or a corporation, only the State or
the corporation can be required to produce them, and that it is for the State or the corporation to
do so through its proper officer.”201 However, such analysis is different for witness testimony.

Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 1 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia July 1, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
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Rules of Procedures and Evidence, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, 14 March 1994,
Rule 54 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60].
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case no. IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, Appeals Chamber, ¶ 17 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia July 1, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].
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The court examined Blaskic’s reasoning, looking at the customary international law of State
official immunity, in particular the Blaskic determination that a “State official has acted on
behalf of the State” and “only the State can be responsible for the acts of that official” and
determined instead that State official immunity was inapplicable at International Tribunals.202
The Krstic Appeals Chamber found that all of the authorities the Blaskic case relied on related to
immunity against prosecution and not against witness testimony.203 Krstic then notes that the
customary international law Blaskic cites is incorrect because State officials do not have
immunity in international criminal courts, citing to the Nuremberg statute and to the Nuremberg
Judgment. Instead, the Appeals Chamber found “no authority” “giving such an immunity to
officials of the nature whose testimony is sought.”204 The court, however, upholds the Blaskic
exceptions to witness testimony where the information is privileged205 and where the witness
may be asked questions raising national security issues.206
The ICTY therefore interprets customary international law to allow subpoenas for State
officials witness testimony because
1)

the State official immunity does not apply to international criminal tribunals;

2)

the ICTY statute expressly strips State officials from immunity from prosecution; and

3)

the requirement to send subpoenas to the State and not the individual State official only
applies to document production.
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Id. (citing Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 70 “notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 66 and 67, reports,
memoranda, or other internal documents prepared by a party, its assistants or representatives in connection with the
investigation or preparation of the case, are not subject to disclosure or notification under those Rules.”)
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C.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda closely follows the ICTY Krstic
precedent granting the Tribunal the authority to subpoena witnesses who are State officials. The
ICTR has the authority to subpoena witnesses because
1)

the State official immunity does not apply to international criminal tribunals;

2)

the ICTR statute expressly strips State officials from immunity from prosecution; and

3)

the ICTR has the authority to subpoena witnesses.

1.

Is the ICTR a national or international tribunal?

The ICTR, an international ad hoc tribunal, was formed in the same fashion as the ICTY
and does not have any national tribunal characteristics. It is an international tribunal based on
it’s a) creation, b) judicial composition, c) funding, d) location, and e) its subject matter
jurisdiction.
a.

ICTR’s Creation

The Security Council under their Chapter VII Powers in Resolution 955 created the ICTR
by a unanimous vote.207 As Stated in the ICTY analysis above, this is a valid method of forming
the international ad hoc tribunal.
b.

ICTR’s Judicial Composition

All of the Judges at the ICTR ad hoc tribunal are international with no national judges
serving in Chambers.
c.

ICTR’s funding

207

Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (Nov. 8, 1994)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook, tab 17].
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The ICTR receives funding in the same manner as other UN established program
activities because the ad hoc tribunal is a subsidiary body of the Security Council and reports
directly it.208
d.

ICTR’s location and headquarters

The ICTR is located among the principle judicial organs of the UN including the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands.209
e.

ICTR’s Subject matter jurisdiction

The ICTR has the subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute “persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law” pursuant to Article 1 of its Statute.210 Furthermore,
the ICTY has the jurisdiction to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949,211 genocide,212 and crimes against humanity.213 All the crimes are international
crimes and they are expressly interpreted by international law standards.

2.

Does the ICTR’s Statute expressly eliminate State official immunity
for prosecution?

The ICTR Statute expressly strips State official immunity for the prosecution of criminals
under its jurisdiction. Article 7(2) of the Statute provides that “the official position of any
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Larry D. Johnson, Myers S. McDougal Lecture: UN-based International Criminal Tribunals: How They Mix and
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accused persons, whether as head of State or government or as responsible government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”214

3.

Does the ICTR have the authority to issue witness subpoenas?

The ICTR has the express authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses in Article 28 of its
Statute and Rule 54 of its RPE.
Article 28 States:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal for Rwanda in
the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for
assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including but not
limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The identification and location of persons;
The taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
The service of documents;
The arrest or detention of persons;
The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International
Tribunal for Rwanda.215

Rule 54 States:
At the request of either party or proprio motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may
issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as may be
necessary for the purpose of an investigation or for the preparation or conduct of
the trial.216
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Tribunal for Rwanda, 29 June 1995, Rule 54; Note that the rule is
identical to Rule 54 from the ICTY RPE, which the Krstic case cites. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
61].
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The provisions indicate that the Trial Chamber has the authority to issue subpoenas and that
States must comply with the Tribunal’s requests.

4.

The ICTR case law supports the conclusion that the ICTY may issue
witness subpoenas to State officials

This section of the memorandum will discuss two pertinent decisions that determined the
ICTR’s authority on this matter: the Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze and
Nsengiymva,217 and Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza.218 The Trial Chamber in both decisions
determined that the Tribunal has full authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses.
1. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, et al (particularly, Nsengiyamva)
Nsengiyumva’s Defense counsel requested that a subpoena be issued to compel Major
Jaques Biot’s testimony. Three months before this decision (on April 21 2006), the Chamber
granted the Defense Article 28 request for assistance from the Kingdom of Belgium to order an
interview with Major Biot. The Defense was unsatisfied with this meeting because Major Biot
refused to testify and asked to Trial Chamber to issue a subpoena to Major Biot. The Court first
determined the proper circumstances in which it would issue a subpoena for witness testimony.
The court then analyzed its ability to issue such subpoenas to State officials.
First, the Trial Chambers found that in order to successfully request that the court issue a
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Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on Request for a Subpoena for Major Jaques Biot, Judgment (July 14, 2006)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62].
Case No. ICTR-97-20-1, Decision on Semenza’s Motion for Subpoenas, Depositions, and Disclosure, Judgment
(Oct. 20, 2000) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 63].
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subpoena, the prosecutor or defense must show must demonstrate a reasonable basis for the
belief that the prospective witness is likely to give information that will materially assist the
applicant with respect to clearly identified issues in the forthcoming trial.219
Second, the Trial Chamber found that “government officials enjoy no immunity from
subpoena, when the subject matter of their testimony was obtained in the course of government
service.”220 The court found that the unsuccessful reasonable efforts at securing the witness’
voluntary appearance necessitated a subpoena for “the fair conduct of trial.”221 The Trial
Chamber quoted Krstic, stating that addressing subpoenas to the State is only justified for
document production and not for witness testimony. Further, the court cited Milosevic stating, “a
subpoena is the correct procedural mechanism for seeking to compel a State official to
testify.”222
2. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza
Laurent Semanza did not directly determine the issue of whether the Trial Chamber can
issue subpoenas State officials but implied such a determination. It determined whether the
Chamber should issue subpoenas to witnesses generally.223 The court found that it could, based
on ICTR RPE 54. It also found support in Rule 17 of the United States Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads in part that a “subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the
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seal of the court…and shall command each person to which it is directed to attend and give
testimony at the time and place specified therein.” The court also found support in the ICTY’s
issuance of numerous subpoenas for decisions Prosecutor v. Delalic and others, Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, and Prosecutor v. Kuperskic and others all of the cases relying on an identical rule 54
and Article 29, which is identical to the ICTR Article 28.
The Trial chamber concluded that under Article 28 and Rule 54, the Trial Chamber has
the authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses, “but must primarily rely on State cooperation and
State judicial mechanisms to execute and enforce subpoenas, short of referring the matter to the
Security Council under rule 7bis(A).”224
The Tribunal therefore has the authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses in both their
private and public capacities.

D.

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Although a hybrid court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has the full capacity to issue
witness subpoenas to State officials. Based on its international character, its Statute, RPE, and
case law, the SCSL has the authority to issue witness subpoenas because
1.

the State official immunity does not apply to international criminal tribunals;

2.

the SCSL statute expressly strips State officials from immunity from prosecution;
and

3.

the SCSL has the authority to subpoena witnesses.

1.

224
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The SCSL is a hybrid tribunal that was formed in a different manner than the ICTY and
ICTR. It is an international tribunal based on it’s a) creation, b) judicial composition, c) funding,
d) location, and e) its subject matter jurisdiction.
a.

SCSL’s Creation

The SCSL was created through a bilateral treaty between the UN and the respective
countries. The SCSL signed a treaty with the Security Council forming the tribunal. Therefore,
unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL was not imposed on the countries concerned, but was
rather created with the consent of each nation.225 The Trial Chamber defended the SCSL’s
international character stating that the agreement to create the tribunal between Sierra Leone and
the UN was representative of an agreement between Sierra Leone and all members of the UN.226
The Trial Chamber also concluded that the agreement was a representation of the overall will of
the international community (including Sierra Leone) to try the crimes committed in Sierra
Leone at an international level.227 The Trial Chamber concluded that the SCSL was therefore “a
truly international court.”228
b.

SCSL’s Judicial Composition
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The SCSL does not have an entirely international judicial staff and was still considered
characteristically international. Rather, a majority of the Judges are international in each of the
Chambers, while a minority of the Judges are from Sierra Leone.229
c.

SCSL’s funding

The SCSL receives funding in from voluntary contributions of UN Member States and
does not receive contributions from the general UN budget.230
d.

SCSL’s location and headquarters

The SCSL is located in Sierra Leone.231 The need to hold Charles Taylor’s Trial outside
of Sierra Leone was at issue at the Taylor trial.232 The Court relocated Taylor’s Trial from Sierra
Leone to The Hague to ensure that Taylor’s supporters would not use violent measures to disrupt
or delay the trial.233
e.

SCSL’s Subject matter jurisdiction

The SCSL has jurisdiction over both international and domestic crimes. It has the subject
matter jurisdiction to prosecute “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”234 The SCSL has the jurisdiction to prosecute breaches

229
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of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocol II,235 crimes against
humanity,236 other serious violations of international humanitarian law237 and domestic crimes
under Sierra Leone criminal law including child abuse and destructions of homes and
property.238

2.

Does the SCSL’s Statute expressly eliminate State official immunity
for prosecution?

The SCSL contains a similar clause to the ICTY and ICTR stripping State officials from
immunity in Article 6(2):
The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.239

3.

Does the SCSL have the authority to issue witness subpoenas?

The SCSL has the express authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses in RPE 54. It
provides:
At the request of either party or on its own motion, a Judge or a Trial Chamber
may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as
may be necessary for the purpose of an investigation or for the preparation or
conduct of the trial.240
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4.

The SCSL case law supports the conclusion that the SCSL may issue
witness subpoenas to State officials

Two relevant cases from the SCSL discuss the Special Court’s authority to subpoena
witnesses who are former Presidents acting in their official capacities but do not mention the
question of State immunity: Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kalla, and Gbao241 and Prosecutor v. Norman,
Fofana, and Kondewa.242 The Special Court cites the Krstic and Bagasora decisions in both
cases , but does not analyze their holdings on State official immunity. Seemingly, the Special
Court takes for granted its authority to subpoena witnesses regardless of their official status.
While the court never explicitly mentions that the official Status is not relevant, it could imply
such a conclusion by never addressing the issue at all. Instead, the Special Court focuses on the
appropriate standard for requesting a subpoena in general.
1.

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kalla, and Gbao

In Sesay, Sesay’s Defense counsel requested the Trial Chamber to issue a subpoena to
H.E. Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone compelling
him to attend a pre-testimony interview and to appear as a witness at trial.243 The former
president had “actively avoided attempts to obtain his cooperation to become a witness.”244 The
Trial Chamber used its Rule 54, allowing the Judge or Trial Chamber to issue “orders,
summonses, subpoenas. . .” and precedent from the ICTY’s Krstic and the ICTR Bagasora
241
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decisions as justifications for approving the subpoena motion. However, the Trial Chamber only
used these decisions to indicate the proper standard for permitting subpoena requests: the
subpoena is necessary and it is for the purpose of an investigation.245
Perhaps the Trial Chamber did not address the State official immunity issue because the
Prosecutor may have not brought forth the State immunity argument to prevent the subpoena.
However, the court clearly cites the Krstic and Bagasora cases that both address State official
immunity and confirm the Special Court’s authority to subpoena the tribunal. The Trial
Chamber may have assumed that State officials were not immune from subpoenas based on its
power to subpoena under Rule 54 and its power to prosecute regardless of a person’s official
status.
2.

Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, and Kondewa246

In Norman, the Appeals Chamber made two determinations potentially helpful to the
SCL. First, it determined that although the SCSL is a hybrid court, it might use the ICTY and
ICTR decisions for guidance as it sees fit pursuant to Article 10 of its Statute.247 Second, it
ignored the State immunity question altogether while it analyzed whether to approve the
Defense’s request for a subpoena to a President.248 The Court instead suggested that the Defense
should request subpoenas from other high-ranking officials who it deemed had the information
the Defense needed.249 Like Sesay, the court probably took for granted that State officials are not
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immune from the Special Court’s jurisdiction based on their official status.
Norman and Fonfana’s Defense counsels appealed the Trial Chamber’s denial of their
motion to subpoena President Kabbah. The Trial Chamber denied their motion because they did
not show that the subpoena was necessary for a legitimate purpose pursuant to the ICTY Krstic
test.250 The Appeals Chamber affirmed the lower court decision because the “information sought
form the President was ‘available through other means.’”251 The Appeals Chamber first
established that the Special Court has the authority to issue subpoenas to witnesses under Rule
54.252 The Appeals Chamber then showed that the Defense did not prove a necessary and
legitimate purpose due to its “own submission” that other relevant State officials may have the
same information listing “Vice President Joe Demby, former members of the CDF National
Coordinating Committee, former members of the War Council, the First Accused and other CDF
commanders.”253 The Appeals Chamber at no point mentioned the issue of State immunity.
Citing Krstic, which overruled the Blaskic State immunity decision, suggests that the court
assumed that State officials are not immune from the courts authority to subpoena.

E.

The International Criminal Court

The ICC is a permanent international criminal court. The ICC is characteristically an
international court, formed by a universal multilateral treaty signed by 193 States.254 However,
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the ICC may have more difficulty than the previous international tribunals at issuing subpoenas
to State officials. While the ICC Rome Statute strips State official immunity from prosecution,
the Rome Statute limits its own power to compel witness testimony. In light of the fact that the
ICC was set into force by treaty and contains provisions requiring State Party cooperation, the
ICC may be able to successfully compel State official witness testimony only for State Parties.
The ICC will likely have difficultly exercising authority to subpoena State officials of States not
a Party to the Rome Statute.

1.

Is the ICC an international or national court?

Analysis of State official immunity from witness subpoenas at the ICC is slightly
different than the previous international tribunals. The ICC is the product of a multilateral treaty,
whereas the United Nations Security Council created the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. The ICC is a permanent criminal court whereas the ICTY and the ICTR were
created in response to specific situations and will be in existence for a limited time period. The
ICC is a hybrid court, which uses both international and national standards for prosecution. It is
a “complementary court” that cannot take cases currently under a national court’s jurisdiction but
may take cases if the country is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or to prosecute.255

2.

Does the Rome Statute expressly eliminate State official immunity
from prosecution?

notebook at tab 69].
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Like the above tribunals, the ICC contains a provision stripping State immunity defenses
for criminal prosecution. Article 27 of the Rome Statute, titled “[i]irrelevance of official
capacity” reads:
1. This statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State of Government, a
member of Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and or itself constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 256

Importantly, section 2 specifically mentions that the court will have jurisdiction over State
officials despite any procedural rules. This may include the Court’s authority to subpoena
witnesses.

3.

Does the ICC have the authority to issue witness subpoenas?

The ICC expressly limits its own power to issue subpoenas for witness testimony.
Article 64 outlines the “powers and functions of the Trial Chamber” and indicates that
6. In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of the trial, the
Trial Chamber may, as necessary:. . .
(b) Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of
documents and other evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance of States
as provided in this Statute.257
The Rome Statute also uses limiting language in Article 93 discussing the “[o]ther forms
of cooperation” by State Parties. It reads:
256
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1.States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under
procedures of national law, comply with the requests by the Court to provide the
following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions:
(c)The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;. . .
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before
the Court;. . .
7. (a) The Court may request the temporary transfer of a person in custody for the
purposes of identification or for obtaining testimony or other assistance. The
person may be transferred if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The person freely gives his or her informed consent to the transfer; and
(ii) The requested State agrees to the transfer, subject to such conditions as that
State and the Court may agree.258
In these provisions, the court, while noting that it may “require the attendance and testimony of
witnesses” also limits State Party cooperation to only “voluntary” witnesses. Although scholars
are concerned that the Court does not have sufficient authority to subpoena witnesses, the
language that the court may “require” their testimony and that the State Parties must cooperate
with the “questioning of any person” may be sufficient.
The Rome Statute also contains a provision (Article 98(1)) that limits its ability to subject
third party State officials to its jurisdiction. That provision reads:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that
third State for the waiver of the immunity.259
This provision limits the Courts ability to successfully subpoena State officials for testimony if
they are not from Party States.
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Although, like the other international criminal tribunals and hybrid courts, the ICC does
not have direct enforcement mechanisms for requiring witness testimony, many of the Rome
Statute’s articles provide a means for the Court to elicit witness cooperation.260
1)

Article 93(1)(b) provides a broad duty for States to assist the Court in collection of
evidence. It indicates that States are under an obligation to comply with a request of the
Court for the “identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items.”261

2)

Article 93(1)(e) provides that State Parties shall facilitate the voluntary appearance of
persons as witnesses or experts before the Court. Although this article expressly uses the
term “voluntary,” Article 64(6)(b) bolsters the Court’s authority by providing that the
Trial Chamber may “require the attendance and testimony of witnesses.”262

3)

Article 88 provides that State Parties are under a duty to implement national legislation,
which will facilitate cooperation with the Court. It States “State parties shall ensure that
there are procedures available under national law for all the forms of cooperation which
are specified under this part [9].”263 Thus far, almost all State Parties have complied.264

4)

Article 86 provides that States are under the general obligation to assist the ICC fully in
its investigations and prosecutions of crimes within its jurisdiction.

5)

State Parties are obligated to cooperate with the ICC based on treaty obligations. Upon
signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, each State has a duty to cooperate with the ICC in
the manner and under the conditions set out by the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.265

6)

The ICC has no power to directly sanction any State for non-cooperation. The ICC may
refer the matter to the Assembly of State Parties or to the UN Security Council, which
may issue a binding order pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N Charter.266

260

Sylvia Ntube Ngane, Witnesses before the International Criminal Court, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 8 (2009) 431-457 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72].
261

Rome Statute, International Criminal Court [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 71].

262

Id.

263

Id.

264

Ngane, supra note 259, at 443-44 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72].

265

Id. at 445.

266

Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, Article 87(7) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 71].

84

85
F.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

It is unclear whether the ECCC has the authority to subpoena State officials. The reason
for the uncertainty is the issue of whether the ECCC is primarily a Cambodian or an international
court. Both the Court’s Internal Rules and the ECCC Law grant the court the authority to
subpoena witnesses. The ECCC Law also grants the Court the authority to prosecute State
officials.267 However, if the court is mostly a national court, the authority to prosecute and to
subpoena State is unwarranted under international law.

1.

Is the ECCC a National or International Court?
a.

ECCC’s creation

The ECCC was established by a domestic Cambodian law pursuant to a 2003 agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of Cambodia setting out the legal basis and
principles for their cooperation. This was approved by the Cambodian legislature and
implemented by the ECCC law in 2004.268 The ECCC was not created by an international
agreement like the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL. However, the Cambodian Deputy Prime
Minister Sok An considered the court a national court that involves both national and
international law, national and international judges, prosecutors, staff, and financing.269 The pretrial chamber has said that the court is "a special internationalized tribunal" because it is "an
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independent entity within the Cambodian court structure."270
b.

ECCC’s Judicial Composition, funding, and location

The ECCC does not have an entirely international judicial staff. Rather, the ECCC has a
majority of national judges and a minority of international judges in each of the Chambers. The
Court has an International Co-Prosecutor, an International Co-Investigative Judge, and a mix of
foreign and domestic Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber Judges. The ECCC receives funding
in from voluntary contributions of UN Member States and does not receive contributions from
the general UN budget.271 The ECCC is located in Cambodia.272 These factors suggest that the
ECCC is primarily a national tribunal.
c.

Subject matter jurisdiction

The ECCC has a valid claim that it is an “internationalized court” because it prosecutes
international crimes. Under the ECCC Law the Court has the jurisdiction to prosecute homicide,
torture,273 Genocide,274 crimes against humanity,275 grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions,276 crimes against internationally protected persons under the Vienna Convention of
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1961 on Diplomatic Relations.277 The above crimes are all serious international crimes that have
previously been adjudicated at Nuremberg, ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.
Originally, the ECCC was intended to apply Cambodian criminal procedural law and to
draw on international procedures when necessary to fill in the gaps between domestic
Cambodian law and international standards. This notion is codified in Article 23 of the ECCC
law stating:
If these existing procedures do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is
uncertainty regarding their interpretation or application or if there is a question
regarding their consistency with international standards, the Co-Investigating
Judges may seek guidance in procedural rules established at the international
level.278
Before the ECCC developed its procedure code in August 2007, the Chambers
drafted their own Internal Rules by judicial plenary powers in June 2007. The Judges
decided that, when the Procedure Code was finally established in August 2007, that it
should “only be applied where a question arises which is not addressed by the Internal
Rules.” The Court went further to state that where there is "uncertainty regarding the
interpretation or application" of these rules, "guidance may also be sought in procedural
rules established at the international level."279

2.

Does the ECCC’s Law eliminate State official immunity for
prosecution?
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The ECCC law contains a provision stripping State official immunity. Article 29 of the
ECCC Law State that “any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or
committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually
responsible for the crime. The position or rank of any Suspect shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.”280
3.

Does Cambodia grant State officials immunity under its domestic
laws?

ECCC cannot subpoena State officials of other nations of the Court if it is considered
mostly a national court. The Cambodia Constitution provides that members of the National
Assembly and Senate are immune from criminal arrest and detention unless waived in Article 80
which reads: "[t]he accusation, arrest, or detention of [a National Assembly] member shall be
made only with the permission of the National Assembly"281 and Article 104282 provides the
same language for the Senate. The Constitution also recognizes the potential liability for any
“crime or misdemeanor that he/she has committed in the course of his/her duty" for members of
the Royal Government if the National Assembly votes to file charges against them.283 The King
Father enjoyed “inviolability.” However, neither the Constitution not any Cambodian Laws offer
immunity from testifying at a domestic Cambodian or international court.
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4.

Does the ECCC have the authority to issue witness subpoenas?

The Internal Rules grant the Judges the authority to summon and "take Statements from
any person whom they consider conducive to ascertaining the truth."284 Summonses are defined
by the Internal Rules as "an order to any person to appear before the ECCC."285 Once
summoned, witnesses must appear:

Rule 60. Interview of Witnesses
3. Any person who has been summoned by the Co-Investigating Judges as a
witness must appear. In the case of refusal to appear, the Co-Investigating Judges
may issue an order requesting the Judicial Police to compel the witness to appear.
Such order must include the identity of the witness and shall be dated and signed
by the Co-Investigating Judges. 286

5.

ECCC case law demonstrates the ECCC’s difficulty in issuing witness
subpoenas to State officials

The ECCC likely has the authority to subpoena witnesses although it has not been met
with much success. Whether the courts will attempt to enforce the subpoenas already issued and
force State official cooperation may develop and provide guidance for the STL in the future.
Most recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a split decision concerning the refusal of six State
officials to give testimony when the Court issued them each subpoenas to testify.287 The Court’s
international judges were in favor of imposing sanctions on the State officials who instructed
those subpoenaed not to testify while the national judges were not. The International Co284
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Investigative Judge summoned 6 State officials to testify on September 25, 2009. The officials
never responded but the Phnom Penh Post published an article stating that government
spokesman Khieu Kanharth said that the government’s position was that “they should not give
testimony.”288
On January 11, 2010, the International Co-Investigative Judge concluded that the
“persons concerned have refused to attend for testimony” and have still refused to this day.289
Judges Catherine Marchi-Uhel and Rowan Downing determined that the evidence shows there
was a “reason to believe” the individuals “may” have interfered with the trial.290 They also note
that “preventing testimony from witnesses that have been deemed conductive to ascertaining the
truth may infringe upon the fairness of the trial.”291 Cambodian judges Prak Kimsan, Ney Thol
and Huot Vuthy said, however, that the court's Co-Investigating Judges had been right to
conclude that no investigation was necessary.292
The case mainly dealt with whether the government spokesperson’s Statements can be
considered an interference, and therefore is not conclusive on the issue of State official
subpoenas. It does, however, shed light on the disagreement between the international and
national judges of the Court and how it may influence whether the STL can impose sanctions on
State officials or third parties interfering with the administration of justice. In the absence of a
super-majority of judges, the request for an investigation by lawyers for former Khmer Rouge
Foreign Minister Ieng Sary and Brother No 2 Nuon Chea was dismissed.
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Although the ECCC applied the ICTY and ICTR precedent granting international
tribunals the authority to issue witness subpoenas, the Court has been unsuccessful in enforcing
their powers. The issue of the six State officials avoiding the ECCC’s witness subpoenas has not
yet been resolved despite the court’s issuance of 10 separate subpoena requests. The Court will
likely be forced to address its capacity to issue witness subpoenas. The ECCC will only be able
to successfully exercise full jurisdiction over State officials if it established that it is an
international court that has a vertical model relationship with national courts.

G.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon

It is unclear whether the STL will be able to successfully subpoena State official
testimony although there are many factors that weigh in the Tribunal’s favor for such authority:
(1) The STL is primarily an international tribunal; (2) the Pre-Trial Judge and a majority of the
Chambers are international judges who may favor granting the Tribunal international powers; (3)
the Statute and RPE clearly allow the STL to subpoena witnesses; and (4) the Rules of Evidence
and Procedure (“RPE”) suggest that State officials are included in those who must give
testimony upon subpoena.
Factors weighing against the STL’s authority to subpoena witnesses are: (1) terrorism is
not one of the core international crimes and the Tribunal uses solely Lebanese Criminal Code for
its subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the Statute does not contain a provision stripping State
immunity for prosecution or process unlike all the other criminal tribunals and courts analyzed
above; and (3) the Tribunal has limited authority to compel State party and Third party State
cooperation. These factors will be discussed further below.
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1.

Is the STL an International or National Court?

The STL is a hybrid court that has primarily international characteristics. The SecretaryGeneral has characterized the STL has an international court because its international elements
outweigh its national elements.293 Its international characteristics are (1) the Security Council
established the STL under its Chapter VII powers from the United Nations Charter,294 (2) it
operates outside of the Lebanese justice system (similar to the SCSL), (3) the government of
Lebanon has a duty to cooperate with the tribunal (unlike the ECCC), and (4) the tribunal has
primacy over domestic court proceedings concerning crimes within its jurisdiction.295 However,
the STL remains independent from the UN because (1) only the Registrar of the Tribunal will be
a UN staff member (similar to the SCSL), (2) the STL receives no funding from the UN budget
and instead receives 49% funding from donations and 51% funding from Lebanon.
Heather Ludwig’s memorandum to the STL Prosecutor discusses the STL’s international
character in depth starting on page 33.
c.

Judge Composition

The STL’s three Chambers are all composed of a majority of international Judges.296 The
Pre-Trial Chamber consists of one international judge, the Trial Chamber consists of one
Lebanese and two international judges and the Appeals Chamber consists of two Lebanese
Judges and three international judges. This practice differs from the ECCC, which constitutes a
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majority of Cambodian national judges who need the support of at least one international judge.
The fact that the STL’s Pre-Trial judge is an international judge suggests that State official
witness subpoena requests will likely be permitted.
d.

Jurisdiction and applicable law

The STL has subject matter jurisdiction over the assassination of Rafik Hariri as well as
other acts between October 1, 2004 and December 12, 2005 if they are in similar gravity and
nature and are connected with the Hariri assassination, and later incidents with the Security
Council approval.297 The applicable subject matter law is Lebanese criminal law only, especially
with regard to the crimes of terrorism.298 Lebanese domestic rules and procedures with
principles of international criminal procedure guide the judge’s procedural law.299 The ICTY,
ICRT and ICC all only have jurisdiction over international crimes such as genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
The STL will be the first international tribunal without any of the core crimes against
international law included in its jurisdiction. The Security Council and the STL agreed the attack
on Hariri constituted a local crime committed in violation of Lebanese law. However, it is
unclear whether terrorism is an international crime. Although there is currently no international
definition of terrorism, it can be considered international as a crime against humanity. The
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Security Council specifically agreed to remove crimes against humanity from the Statute300
although the Secretary General suggested that the attacks could be considered crimes against
humanity.301 Yet, considering the relatively small number of deaths (about 22) and injuries
(about 500), and that the intentions behind the attacks were “political destabilization” of the State
rather than widespread attacks against the civilian population, the crimes are likely not crimes
against humanity.302 The attacks may still be considered international crimes if “terrorism” is
considered as such. Refer to Section

2.

Does the STL’s statute eliminate State official immunity for
prosecution?

The STL differs from the other international and hybrid tribunals in that it does not
contain a provision stripping State official immunity for those being tried. Heather Ludwig’s
memorandum to the Prosecutor provides arguments in support of the notion that adding the
provision is unnecessary for the drafters of the STL’s Statute because it has become customary in
international criminal law for international tribunals to prosecuting criminals regardless of their
official capacities.303
Additionally, because the STL is predominantly an international tribunal, it may have
jurisdiction to prosecute State officials because it enjoys the vertical relationship with national
courts. However, the STL may face problems arguing that it has a vertical relationship with
300
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third States because the Tribunal’s statute explicitly indicates that the STL only has enforcement
authority with third States if they agree to cooperate with the Tribunal.
The horizontal model governs the STL relationship with third States. States are only
required to comply with the STL’s requests if the State is under an agreement to do so with the
STL under rules 13, 14, and 15. Under Rule 21(A), non-compliance by third States who have
not entered into an agreement is resolved by the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in
the relevant agreement. Third States who have not formed an agreement with the STL are not
bound to cooperate with the STL. The President of the Tribunal under Rule 21(B) may consult
with the competent authorities of the State in order to secure their cooperation. Considering the
foreseeable difficulty of obtaining Third Party State compliance, the STL Rules of Procedure and
Evidence facilitate the formation of third State agreements allowing the President, (Rule 13),
Prosecutor (Rule 14), the Head of Defense Office (Rule 15), and the Registrar acting under the
authority of the STL President (Rule 39) to directly seek cooperation from any State.

3.

What is the STL’s authority to subpoena witnesses and subpoena State
officials?

While the Tribunal will have access to evidence collected by Lebanese national
authorities and by the International Independent Investigation Commission in accordance with
the Security Council resolution 1595, the admissibility of which will be decided by “international
standards on the collection of evidence,”304 the Chambers has its own individual powers to
collect evidence. Article 18 of the Statute gives the Pre-Trial Judge authority to, at the request of
the Prosecutor, “issue. . . orders . . .for the conduct of the investigation and for the preparation of
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a fair and expeditious trial.” The Trial Chamber may also “upon request or proprio motu. . . at
any stage of the trial decide to call additional witnesses and/or order the production of additional
evidence.”305 The “standards of international criminal law” and Lebanese Criminal Procedure
will guide the Chamber’s authority under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.306
a.

Rules of Procedure and Evidence

The Rules of Procedure and Evidence grant the Prosecutor the right to request orders
from the Pre-Trial Judge or Chamber to summon and question suspects, victims and witnesses,
and may seek assistance from any State authority concerned.307 Rule 77 grants the Pre-Trial
Judge the authority to issue “orders, summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders or
requests as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation.” Rule 78 grants the Pre-Trial
judge to “issue a summons to appear to a suspect, an accused or a witness.”
The Rules suggest that the Chambers may subpoena State officials. First, Rule 82
requires that “Lebanon or a State which has agreed to provide cooperation with the Tribunal or
one of its organs” (which may be interpreted to read a State official or State entity), “or has on
any other basis assumed an obligation to provide assistance, the national authorities shall act
promptly and with all due diligence to ensure the proper and effective execution thereof.” This
rule requires State cooperation and does not provide and exception to official immunity. Rather,
it suggests that State who have agreed to cooperate must assist in witness subpoenas delivered to
State officials.
Second, the Rule 93(A)(ii) envisions the possibility that a witness’ testimony may
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produce “a serious risk that imperative national security interests might be jeopardized should
the witness’ identity or affiliation be revealed” and provides the opportunity for the Pre-Trial
Judge to question the witness privately. This situation would most frequently arise for State
officials who have information related to national security and therefore suggests that the
Tribunal assumes its power to subpoena State officials.
b.

Lebanese Criminal Code

The Lebanese Criminal Code also gives the Court the authority to subpoena witnesses
and State officials. In Section III, Art. 86 the Investigating Judge must “summon the persons
whose names appear in the complaint, the report or the submissions as well as anybody else who,
in his view, may be able to provide evidence to assist the investigation.” Further, the Code goes
on to read, “A witness may not be excused form testifying unless it can be demonstrated that he
is legally bound to secrecy.” This Article suggests that the Court’s power to subpoena witnesses
extends to State officials unless they are bound to secrecy. More convincing, Article 85 States
that the Investigating Judge shall take Statements from the “President of the Republic, the
Speaker of the Chamber or Deputies or the Prime Minister” by going to the relevant office.
Nothing in the Lebanese Criminal Code extends this power to State officials from other Nations.
Yet coupled with the RPE and international precedent, the Tribunal may have such authority.

4.

What is the STL’s Authority to compel State cooperation in obtaining
witness testimony?

The STL Statute does not contain a provision granting a Universal obligation to
cooperate unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, which impose the obligation to cooperate with the
Tribunal on all UN member States in Articles 29 and 28 of their Statutes respectively. Instead,
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The STL has three tiers of authority to compel State cooperation. First, the Tribunal’s RPE
requires a full duty to cooperate from Lebanon. RPE Rule 15 of the Statute States that the
Prosecutor or Defense may request Lebanese authorities carry our the questing witnesses
searching premises or seizing potential evidence or allow the Defense or Prosecution to conduct
the questioning, or a combination of both efforts. RPE Rule 20(a) provides that Lebanon must
provide any requested assistance without undue delay. Furthermore, Lebanese authorities who
“receive summons to appear, a warrant of arrest, a transfer order, an order for the production of
documents or information or any order of cooperation” must provide “assistance without undue
delay.”308
Second, the Tribunal requires that States who have made agreements to cooperate with
the Tribunal must do so upon the Prosecutors, Defense’s or Chamber’s requests. Under Rules
14, 15, 16, and 18, the Prosecutor and the Defense may request that the relevant authorities from
this State provide access to witnesses or other relevant sources of evidence. Rule 13(b), RPE and
Article 7(d) of agreement requires States and other entities to conclude assistance agreements or
negotiate with appropriate measures of assistance to the STL. States bound by these
arrangements are obligated to cooperate may be requested to provide assistance by STL.
Third, the Prosecutor, Defense and the Chambers may request cooperation from Third
States that do not have any agreement to cooperate with the STL, but have no authority to
compel their cooperation. States have no obligation to comply with STL requests unless have an
assistance agreement or arrangement under Rule 21(a). The President of the Tribunal may
consult with the State authorities in order to obtain the cooperation, but it is not required under
Rule 21(b). The Tribunal has no independent authority to compel witness testimony, like the
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other tribunals and courts discussed above, but may request that the Security Council issue a
binding order.309

VI.

Conclusion
The STL will likely be able to subpoena high-ranking State officials only if the Tribunal

is considered primarily international. The STL is primarily an international court based on its
formation, its location and its judicial composition. It is arguable whether “terrorism” as its
subject-matter jurisdiction gives it international or national character. While the STL uses
Lebanese Penal Code, the Code mirrors international criminal law standards. Terrorism may be
considered an international crime under Security Counsel resolution 1373, which requires all
Member States to criminalize all forms of terrorism.
If the STL is considered an international court, it may successfully subpoena State
officials from States that have agreed to cooperate with the tribunal. Otherwise, the Tribunal
may only request cooperation from third Party States but will have difficulty enforcing such
requests. The Prosecutor could argue that, like the SCSL Taylor Case, that the agreement
between the STL and the United Nations is representative of an agreement between Lebanon
and all members of the UN. However, for the STL, Chapter VII enforcement powers apply to
only the first paragraph of the Tribunal’s Resolution 1757, which does not address the issues of
requiring compliance by third party States with the court’s decisions and requests. Lebanon is
the only nation bound by the Security Council Resolution to co-operate fully with the requests of
the STL. Supporting the Tribunal’s international character therefore is of utmost importance.

See Keith White’s Memorandum to the STL Prosecutor Issue 12 for more information on the STL’s capacity to
request Security Council binding orders. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
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